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Abstract. In this paper we dene a trapdoor function called SBIM(Q)
by using multivariate polynomials over the eld of rational numbers Q:
The public key consists of 2n multivariate polynomials with 3n variables
y1; : : : ; yn; z1; : : : ; z2n. The yi variables take care for the information
content, while the zi variables are for redundant information. Thus, for
encryption of a plaintext of n rational numbers, a ciphertext of 2n ra-
tional numbers is used. The security is based on the fact that there are
innitely many solutions of a system with 2n polynomial equations of 3n
unknowns.
The public key is designed by quasigroup transformations obtained from
quasigroups presented in matrix form. The quasigroups presented in ma-
trix form allow numerical as well as symbolic computations, and here we
exploit that possibility. The private key consists of several 1n and nn
matrices over Q, and one 2n 2n matrix.
Keywords: trap-door function, public key, private key, encryption, de-
cryption, matrix form of quasigroup, quasigroup transformations, bi-
permutations
1 Introduction
A function f : A ! B is said to be one way function if for each x 2 A it can
be eectively computed the image f(x), but for any y 2 B nding a preimage
x 2 A, such that f(x) = y, has to be computationally infeasible. In other words,
computation of f(x) can be realized with an algorithm of polynomial complex-
ity, and computation of a preimage of y can be realized only with algorithms
of exponential complexity. A trapdoor function is a one way function such that
the preimage can be eectively computed when some additional (usually secret)
information is known. A trapdoor function has important applications in cryp-
tography, especially for designing public key infrastructures, and for many others
cryptographic primitives. For that purposes a trapdoor function has to be real
time computable and it has to use small instance of the computer memory.
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There are not many trapdoor functions. The most popular is the RSA [7]. In
this paper we present a new trapdoor function, called SBIM(Q). It is dened over
the eld of rational numbers Q, but its construction can be used over any innite
eld. The public key of SBIM(Q) consists of a set of multivariate polynomials.
The rst such scheme was constructed by Matsumoto and Imai [4] in 1985. After
that, several other systems of that type were designed, unfortunately almost all
of them were broken. An excellent survey article for these schemes is written by
Wolf and Preneel [9].
The construction of SBIM(Q) is based on so called quasigroup string trans-
formations. In Section 2 we give the needed denitions and properties (without
proofs), in order to make clear the construction of SBIM(Q). For more details
one may consult [5], [8].
The private key of SBIM(Q) consists of several nonsingular matrices, and
the public key consists of a system of multivariate polynomial equations. The
encryption is by evaluating the polynomial expressions, and decryption is by
several multiplications of vectors by matrices.
In Section 2 we dene the notion of quasigroup bi-permutations and the string
transformations dened by them. In Section 3 the construction of SBIM(Q) is
given, as well as the encryption and decryption functions. Section 4 contains an
example in all details. Some issues on security, implementation, and optimization
are discussed in Section 5. Section 6 contains conclusions and future work.
2 Quasigroup bi-permutations
A quasigroup is a groupoid (G; f), where G is a nonempty set and f : GG!
G is a binary operation that satises the property each one of the equations
f(a; x) = b and f(y; a) = b to have a unique solution x, respectively y; then we
also say that f is a quasigroup operation. When G is a nite set, the main body
of the Cayley table of the quasigroup (G; f) represents a Latin square, i.e., a
matrix with rows and columns that are permutations of G. It follows that if we
x one component of f , then the mappings f(x; ) : fxgG! G and f(; y) are
permutations of the set G. That is why we say that the binary operation f is a
(quasigroup) bi-permutation.
Given a quasigroup (G; f) two new operations f (23) and f (13), called paras-
trophes, can be derived from the operation f as follows:
f(x; y) = z , f (23)(x; z) = y , f (13)(z; y) = x: (1)
Then (G; f (23)) and (G; f (13)) are also quasigroups and the algebra (G; f; f (23);
f (13)) satises the identities
f (23)(x; f(x; y)) = y; f(x; f (23)(x; y)) = y;
f (13)(f(x; y); y) = x; f(f (13)(x; y); y) = x:
(2)
In the sequel, when there will be no confusion, we will write a1a2 : : : an instead
of (a1; a2; : : : ; an):
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Quasigroup string transformations are dened on the set Gn = fa1a2 : : :
: : : anj ai 2 Gg; n  1, by using quasigroup operations f1; f2; : : : ; fn on the set
G. Some of the operations fi, and even all of them, can be equal. We dene four
types of transformations. Let l 2 G be a xed element, called a leader. For every
ai; bi 2 G, e  and d transformations are dened as follows:
el(a1a2 : : : an) = b1b2 : : : bn , bi+1 = fi+1(bi; ai+1);
dl(a1a2 : : : an) = b1b2 : : : bn , bi+1 = fi+1(ai; ai+1); (3)
for each i = 0; 1; : : : ; n  1, where b0 = a0 = l. The e0  and d0 transformations
are dened similarly, in reverse way:
e0l(a1a2 : : : an) = b1b2 : : : bn , bi = fn+1 i(ai; bi+1);
d0l(a1a2 : : : an) = b1b2 : : : bn , bi = fn+1 i(ai; ai+1);
(4)
for each i = n; n  1; : : : ; 2; 1, where bn+1 = an+1 = l.
By using the identities (2), we have that
dl(el(a1 : : : an)) = el(dl(a1 : : : an)) = a1 : : : an
when el is dened by the sequence of quasigroup operations f1; : : : ; fn 1; fn
and dl is dened by the sequence of quasigroup operations f
(23)
1 ; f
(23)
2 ; : : : ; f
(23)
n :
Also, when e0l is dened by f1; : : : ; fn 1; fn and d
0
l is dened by f
(13)
1 ; f
(13)
2 ; : : :
: : : ; f
(13)
n we have d0l(e
0
l(a1 : : : an)) = e
0
l(d
0
l(a1 : : : an)) = a1 : : : an as well. This
means that el, dl, e
0
l and d
0
l are permutations on G
n, such that el, dl and e
0
l, d
0
l
are mutually inverse.
The next theorem shows that e  and e0  transformations are useful for
obtaining pseudo-randomness of the transformed strings.
Theorem 1. [5] Consider an arbitrary string  = a1a2 : : : ak where ai 2 G, and
let  be obtained after k applications of e  or e0 transformations on . If k is
an enough large integer then, for each 1  t  k, the distribution of substrings
of  of length t is uniform. (We note that for t > k the distribution of substrings
of  of length t is not uniform.)
A construction of quasigroup bi-permutations is given by the next theorem.
Theorem 2. Let A and B be nonsingular mm matrices and let C be 1m
matrix over a eld F . Then the mapping
f(a1; : : : ; am; b1 : : : ; bm) = (a1; : : : ; am) A+ (b1; : : : ; bm) B + C; (5)
where ai; bi 2 F , is a quasigroup bi-permutation on Fm. The parastrophic oper-
ations f (13) and f (23) of f are dened as follows:
f (13)(x;y) = x A 1 + y  ( B A 1)  C A 1;
f (23)(x;y) = x  ( A B 1) + y B 1   C B 1; (6)
where x = a1 : : : am; y = b1 : : : bm 2 Fm:
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The presentation of the bi-permutations f in matrix form (5) allows f to
be used for symbolic computations. Namely, instead of elements ai; bi 2 F;
we can use any expressions Ei; Hi valuable in F for getting a new expression
f(E1; : : : ; Em;H1; : : : ; Hm). Thus, in the sequel we will use polynomials Ei;Hi
and then f(E1; : : : ; Em;H1; : : : ; Hm) will be polynomials too.
3 Construction of SBIM(Q)
Further on we work with the eld of rational numbers Q. We dene SBIM(Q)
over Q in several steps. We use as a parameter a positive integer n.
Choosing polynomials. Denote by y1; : : : ; yn; z1; : : : ; z2n variables on Q.
Choose randomly n multivariate polynomials Y1; Y2; : : : ; Yn on Q with variables
y1; : : : ; yn such that the system of equations
Y1(y1; : : : ; yn) = b1;
Y2(y1; : : : ; yn) = b2;
: : : : : : : : : : : : (7)
Yn(y1; : : : ; yn) = bn;
for any given bi 2 Q, has unique solution y1 = a1; : : : ; yn = an; ai 2 R. (As usual,
R denotes the eld of real numbers.) One trivial way to choose the polynomials
Yi is by taking a nonsingular nn matrix S over Q and then (Y1; Y2; : : : ; Yn) =
(y1; : : : ; yn)  S: Another simple example, for instance for n = 4, is by taking
Y1 = y1 + 3y2; Y2 = y
3
3   4; Y3 = y4   y1; Y4 = y54 :
Next, we choose randomly n multivariate polynomials Yn+1; Yn+2; : : : ; Y2n on
Q with variables y1; : : : ; yn; z1; : : : ; z2n.
Applying transformation. Let  be a random permutation on the set of
integers f1; 2; : : : ; 2ng, and let denote (X1; : : : ; X2n) = (Y(1); : : : ; Y(2n)), x =
(X1; X2; : : : ; Xn) and y = (Xn+1; Xn+2; : : : ; X2n). We apply e  and e0 transfor-
mations on (X1; X2; : : : ; X2n) for producing new polynomials as follows.
The rst e transformation. At rst we use an e-transformation dened by
a random leader l1 = (l11; : : : ; l1n) 2 Qn and two quasigroup bi-permutations f1
and f2 dened by random nonsingular n n matrices Ai; Bi as following:
f1(l1;x) = l1 A1 + x B1; f2(x0;y) = x0 A2 + y B2;
where x0 = f1(l1;x): Let denote y0 = f2(x0;y):
The second e0 transformation. As second transformation we use an e0-trans-
formation dened by a random leader l2 = (l21; : : : ; l2n) and two quasigroup
bi-permutations f3 and f4 dened by random nonsingular nn matrices Ai; Bi
as following:
f3(y
0; l2) = y0 A3 + l2 B3; f4(x0;y00) = x0 A4 + y00 B4;
where y00 = f3(y0; l2): Let denote x00 = f4(x0;y00):
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The next transformations. The previous two transformations are obligatory.
We can make p (p  0) new e  or e0 transformations in the same manner as
before. It is choice of ours what type of transformation and in which order will
be applied. We start by transforming the n tuples of polynomials x00;y00. For
p = 1 we can take either an e  or an e0 transformation, for p = 2 we can take
either e ; e , or e ; e0 , or e0 ; e  or e0 ; e0  transformations, and so on. For
that purposes we have to take new random leaders li and new random matrices
Ai; Bi. (In that case more secure system will be obtained, the price being paid
with more complex private key. If we want to keep the private key enough small,
we can reuse the previous bi-permutations f1; : : : ; f4 and/or leaders.)
The public key and the encryption. Let p  0 additional transforma-
tions were applied. Then the last transformation was done by some leader l2+p
and bi-permutations f3+p and f4+p, applied on some n tuples of polynomials u
and v. In the case when the last transformation was an e transformation, we de-
note (Z1; : : : ; Zn) = f3+p(l2+p;u) and (Zn+1; : : : ; Z2n) = f4+p((Z1; : : : ; Zn);v).
In the case of an e0 transformation, we denote (Z1; : : : ; Zn) = f3+p(v; l2+p)
and (Zn+1; : : : ; Z2n) = f4+p(u; (Z1; : : : ; Zn)). We choose randomly a nonsingu-
lar 2n 2n matrix R on Q and we denote (A1; A2; : : : ; A2n) = (Z1; : : : ; Z2n) R.
Then the public key consists of the 2n tuple of polynomials (A1; A2; : : : ; A2n).
Note that each Ai = Ai(y1; : : : ; yn; z1; : : : ; z2n) is a multivariate polynomial on
Q with 3n variables.
The encryption of a message M = (m1;m2; : : : ;mn) 2 Qn is as follows.
Choose random elements r1; r2; : : : ; r2n 2 Q and evaluate the polynomials Ai
by taking yj = mj ; zk = rk: The ciphertext is the 2n tuple (c1; c2; : : : ; c2n),
where
c1 = A1(m1; : : : ;mn; r1; : : : ; r2n);
c2 = A2(m1; : : : ;mn; r1; : : : ; r2n);
: : : : : : : : : : : :
c2n = A2n(m1; : : : ;mn; r1; : : : ; r2n):
We note that a plaintext of n rational numbers is encrypted with 2n rational
numbers, we can say that the information eciency is 50%:
The private key. The private key consists of the permutation , of all
leaders l1; l2; l3; : : : and all matrices Ai; Bi; R used for producing the public key.
The leaders and the matrices may not be all dierent. It is obligatory to be
used at least two dierent leaders and at least four dierent matrices for the bi-
permutations. By choosing suitable number of leaders and matrices an optimal
private key can be designed.
Decryption. The decryption is done by applying d  and d0 transforma-
tions. The public key was built up in an upward-down way. The decryption is in
downward-up way.
Given a ciphertext (c1; : : : ; c2n), we rst apply the inverse matrix R
 1 and
obtain (t1; : : : ; t2n) = (c1; : : : ; c2n)  R 1. After that we produce two n-tuples
C1 = (t1; : : : : : : ; tn) and C2 = (tn+1; : : : ; t2n). We have to possible cases.
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The case of a d transformation. Let the last applied transformation for ob-
taining the polynomials (Z1; Z2; : : : ; Z2n) have been an e transformation, de-
ned by a leader l2+p and bi-permutations f3+p and f4+p: Then we apply a
d transformation on C1; C2 by using the leader l2+p and the parastrophes f (23)3+p
and f
(23)
4+p . We obtain two new n-tuples of rational numbers D1 and D2 as follows:
D1 = f
(23)
3+p (l2+p;C1); D2 = f
(23)
4+p (C1;C2):
The case of a d0 transformation. Let the last applied transformation for
obtaining the polynomials (Z1; Z2; : : : ; Z2n) have been an e
0 transformation,
dened by a leader l2+p and bi-permutations f3+p and f4+p: Then we apply a
d0 transformation on C1; C2 by using the leader l2+p and the parastrophes f (13)3+p
and f
(13)
4+p . We obtain two new n-tuples of rational numbers D1 and D2 as follows:
D1 = f
(13)
3+p (C2; l2+p); D2 = f
(13)
4+p (C1;C2):
What we have done is replacing the n tuples of polynomials with n tuples
of rational numbers. We apply these d  or d0 transformations from downward-
up way and after each application we will obtain n-tuples of rational num-
bers. Eventually, at the end, instead of starting n-tuples of polynomials x =
(X1; : : : ; Xn) and y = (Xn+1; : : : ; X2n) we obtain n-tuples of rational numbers
a = (a1; : : : ; an) and b = (an+1; : : : ; a2n).
Finally, we apply the inverse permutation  1 on (a1; a2; : : : ; a2n) to get
(b1 = a 1(1); : : : ; b2n = a 1(2n)). Then we form the system of equations (7)
with the rational numbers b1; b2; : : : ; bn. The solution of the system (7) is the
message M = (m1;m2; : : : ;mn).
4 Example
Here we give an example to illustrate the previous constructions.
We take n = 2 and so we use the variables y1; y2; z1; z2; z3 and z4. We choose
polynomials Y1 = y1   2y2; Y2 = y31   2; Y3 = y31 + y22 + z31 +3y1z4 +2y2z2 +
y1 + y2   z1   z4; Y4 =  z42   y2z1 + 2y1 + z1   z3   z4 and a permutation
 = (3; 2; 1; 4). We have X1 = Y3; X2 = Y2; X3 = Y1; X4 = Y4 and
x = (X1; X2); y = (X3; X4). We also take p = 0:
For the transformations we use the leaders l1 = ( 1; 1) and l2 = (2; 1) and
the following bi-permutations:
f1(x;y) = x

1  1
2  1

+ y

0 3
1 0

; f2(x;y) = x
 1 0
1 1

+ y

2 1
 1  1

;
f3(x;y) = x
 1 0
0  1

+ y

3 5
1 2

; f4(x;y) = x

1  2
1 1

+ y

1 0
0 1

:
The rst e transformation is dened by l1, f1 and f2, and from x;y we
obtain x0;y0 as follows:
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x0 = f1(l1; x) = f1( 1; 1; X1; X2) = (1; 0) + (X2; 3X1) = (1 +X2; 3X1);
y0 = f2(1+X2; 3X1; X3; X4) = ( 1 X2+3X1; 3X1)+(2X3 X4; X3 X4)
= ( 1 + 3X1  X2 + 2X3  X4; 3X1 +X3  X4):
Next, we have to apply an e0 transformation and we use l2, f3 and f4: Then
x0;y0 will be transformed into x00;y00, where
y00 = f3(y0; l2) = f3( 1 + 3X1  X2 + 2X3  X4; 3X1 +X3  X4; 2; 1)
= (1  3X1 +X2   2X3 +X4; 3X1  X3 +X4) + (5; 8)
= (6  3X1 +X2   2X3 +X4; 8  3X1  X3 +X4);
x00 = f4(x0;y00) = f4(1+X2; 3X1; 6 3X1+X2 2X3+X4; 8 3X1 X3+X4)
= (1 + 3X1 +X2; 2(1 +X2) + 3X1)+
+(6  3X1 +X2   2X3 +X4; 8  3X1  X3 +X4)
= (7 + 2X2   2X3 +X4; 6  2X2  X3 +X4):
We obtain Z1 = 7 + 2X2   2X3 +X4; Z2 = 6   2X2  X3 +X4; Z3 =
6 3X1+X2 2X3+X4; Z4 = 8 3X1 X3+X4: Let take a 44 nonsingular
matrix R =
0BB@
2  1 0  3
1 2  1  1
0 3 2 0
 3  1  1 4
1CCA and compute (A1; : : : ; A2n) = (Z1; : : : ; Z2n)  R.
We get the public key
A1 =  4 + 9X1 + 2X2   2X3;
A2 = 15  6X1   3X2   5X3 + 3X4;
A3 =  2  3X1 + 4X2   2X3;
A4 = 5  12X1   4X2 + 3X3:
After replacement of variables we get the nal form of the public key:
A1 =  8 + 7y1 + 13y2   9z1   9z4 + 11y31 + 9y32 + 9z31 + 27y1z4 + 18y2z2;
A2 = 21   5y1 + 4y2 + 9z1   3z3 + 3z4   9y31   6y32   6z31   3z42   18y1z4  
3y2z1   12y2z2;
A3 =  10  5y1 + y2 + 3z1 + 3z4 + y31   3y32   3z31   9y1z4   6y2z2;
A4 = 13  9y1   18y2 + 12z1 + 12z4   16y31   12y32   12z31   36y1z4   24y2z2.
Given a message M(1; 1) (so y1 = y2 = 1), we choose redundant elements
z1 = z2 = z3 = 0; z4 = 1 and we compute the ciphertext (c1; c2; c3; c4) as
following:
c1 = A1(1; 1; 0; 0; 0; 1) = 50;
c2 = A2(1; 1; 0; 0; 0; 1) =  10;
c3 = A3(1; 1; 0; 0; 0; 1) =  22;
c4 = A4(1; 1; 0; 0; 0; 1) =  66:
Hence, (50; 10; 22; 66) is the ciphertext of the plaintext (1; 1).
LetAllice obtained the ciphertext (50; 10; 22; 66). She does not know the
message and the redundant elements. Allice will make a decryption of the cipher-
text as follows. First she compute (50; 10; 22; 66)  R 1 = (8; 10; 10; 8)
and obtain that (t1; t2; t3; t4) = (8; 10; 10; 8).
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She also needs the parastrophes f
(23)
1 ; f
(23)
2 ; f
(13)
3 ; f
(13)
4 for decryption pur-
poses. Recall that the parastrophes of f(x;y) = xA + yB are f (13)(x;y) =
xA 1 + y( BA 1) and f (23)(x;y) = x( AB 1) + yB 1: Then the needed
parastrophes are the following:
f
(23)
1 (x;y) = x

1=3  1
1=3  2

+ y

0 1
1=3 0

;
f
(23)
2 (x;y) = x

1 1
0 1

+ y

1 1
 1  2

;
f
(13)
3 (x;y) = x
 1 0
0  1

+ y

3 5
1 2

;
f
(13)
4 (x;y) = x

1=3 2=3
 1=3 1=3

+ y
 1=3  2=3
1=3  1=3

:
From the 4-tuple (t1; t2; t3; t4) = (8; 10; 10; 8) Allice makes the pairs
C1 = (8; 10) and C2 = ( 10; 8). Since the last applied transformation for
producing the public key was an e0 transformation, she applies on C1 and C2
the d0 transformation dened by l2, f (13)3 and f (13)4 . She computes
D2 = f
(13)
3 (C2; l2) = f
(13)
3 (10; 8; 2; 1) = (15; 16) and
D1 = f
(13)
4 (C1;C2) = f
(13)
4 (8; 10; 10; 8) = (0; 18).
The previous transformation before the last one was an e transformation.
So, Allice applies the d transformation dened by l1, f (23)1 and f (23)2 on D1 and
D2 and she computes
x = f
(23)
1 (l1;D1) = f
(23)
1 ( 1; 1; 0; 18) = (6; 1),
y = f
(23)
2 (D1;D2) = f
(23)
2 (0; 18; 15; 16) = ( 1; 1).
Then Allice knows that X1 = 6; X2 =  1; X3 =  1; X4 = 1 and
by the inverse permutation  1 she get that X3 = Y1 = y1   2y2 =  1 and
X2 = Y2 = y
3
1   2 =  1. From that Allice discovers the sent message M , since
(y1 = 1; y2 = 1) is the solution of the system of polynomial equations
y31   2 =  1;
y1   2y2 =  1:
5 Discussion
Here we will discuss security, implementation, optimization and other issues.
5.1 Security
The security of the SBIM(Q) is based mainly on the innity number of solutions
of a system of 2n polynomial equations with 3n unknowns. If an attacker have
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a ciphertext (c1; c2; : : : ; c2n), he/she can make the system
A1(y1; : : : ; yn; z1; : : : ; z2n) = c1;
A2(y1; : : : ; yn; z1; : : : ; z2n) = c2;
: : : : : : : : : : : : (8)
A2n(y1; : : : ; yn; z1; : : : ; z2n) = c2n:
When the public key is carefully produced, the system (8) has innitely many
rational solutions for the unknowns y1; y2; : : : ; yn, so the attacker cannot com-
pute the plaintext in that way. Even when the ciphertext consists of integers
and the attacker supposes that the plaintext consists only of integers too, well
dened public key can have innitely many integers solutions. Hence, by this
attack, an attacker can only guess the plaintext.
The attacker can only guess the private key as well, since the key space is
innite.
The public key was produced by using linear bi-permutations and we nd
that it is the weakest part of the construction of SBIM(Q). We could not realized
an attack by using this weakness, although it may be possible.
5.2 Implementation
The public key has 2n polynomials of 3n variables. If we bounded the degrees
of the polynomial by 2, the polynomials may have up to (3n)!(3n 1)2 + 6n + 2
members. So, the choice of the starting polynomials should be suitably made for
obtaining desired public key. We think that for n = 4 quite secure public key
can be designed, with quadratic polynomials only.
An obvious question is why we are not using linear polynomials only? The
reason is that in that case the system is not secure.
The presented example in Section 5 shows that the choice of the bi-permuta-
tions have to be carefully done. Choosing simpler matrices Ai; Bi may produce
weak public key. On the other hand, applying more e  and e0 transformations
will produce better public key.
Caution: After any construction of SBIM(Q), it has to be checked if the
system of equations (8) has innitely many solutions for the variables y1; : : : ; yn:
5.3 Performance
The performance of the system depends on the chosen polynomials mainly. For
example, let take n = 4 and let we work with polynomials of degree 2 only.
Those polynomials have at most 91 members (1 constant + 12 linear + 78
quadratic). Then for getting a ciphertext we have to make no more than 8 
12 = 96 additions and 8  156 = 1248 multiplications of rational numbers. Let
assume that 4 transformations were applied for getting the public key. So, 8 44
matrices and 4 1 4 vectors as leaders were used. For computing the plaintext
we have rstly to apply the inverse matrix R 1, then 16 multiplications and 12
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additions of rational numbers will be made. For transformations we have to make
8 multiplications of vectors by matrices, so 128 multiplications and 96 additions
of rational numbers have to be made, and 8 additions of vectors by vectors, so
32 additions more have to be made. Hence, altogether, 140 additions and 144
multiplication of rational numbers have to be made for recovering the plaintext,
i.e., the message.
5.4 Optimization
Some optimization of the system can be made.
The number of variables can be reduced. Namely, instead of using 3n variables
for building the polynomials Yn+1; Yn+2; : : : ; Y3n, we can reduce the number of
polynomials to 2n+m, where 0 < m < n: In that case we have to check that the
system of equations (8) has innitely many solutions for the variables y1; : : : ; yn:
We mentioned that the system is not secure if only linear polynomials are
used. Still, we can use linear polynomials to make the system more simpler. For
example, many of the polynomials Y1; Y2; : : : ; Yn can be linear, and some of the
polynomials Yn+1; Yn+2; : : : ; Y3n too.
One obvious question is why we have used quasigroup transformations? A
quite simpler way to produce the public key of the same type is by taking a
nonsingular 2n 2n matrix T and to compute (A1; : : : ; A2n) = (Y1; : : : ; Y2n) T:
In this case the system is not secure, since then the system (8) can be easily
solved for the variables y1; : : : ; yn (although the redundant variables z1; : : : ; zn
may have innitely many solutions).
6 Conclusion
SBIM(Q) is a public key cryptsystem of multivariate polynomial type. We found
that SBIM(Q) has a moderate speed, comparable to today standard public key
cryptsystems. Also, we found that a version of SBIM(Q) for n = 2 can be imple-
mented in hardware useful for embedded systems. The encryption of SBIM(Q)
can be easily parallelized, since each of the 2n polynomials of the public key can
be independently computed.
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